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Industrial Policy in the Field of
Informatics in Brazil
Walter Douglas Stuber *
Informatics is a rapidly developing industry in Brazil as it is in the rest of the
world. In Brazil, the informatics industry is regulated by legislation which came
into effect in late December, 1984.' This legislation ratifies the policy pursued by
the Secretaria Especial de Informatica (Special Secretary for Informatics) (SEI)
which, since its creation in 1979, has charted an informatics policy for Brazil
unlike previous Brazilian models of industrial development. This policy greatly
restricts opportunities in the field of informatics for multinational corporations
(MNCs) and foreign exporters in favor of national companies. It is intended to
reduce Brazil's dependence on foreign-controlled informatics equipment and
technology. It is likely, however, to prove detrimental to other sectors of the
Brazilian economy.
This article first presents a brief overview of Brazilian industrial development.
This overview provides a basis for understanding how the Brazilian Govern-
ment's informatics policy differs from past Brazilian industrial models. The
article then describes the Brazilian Government's policy in the field of infor-
matics. It concludes that a policy which is less protectionist than the govern-
ment's current program would, through allowing greater foreign participation in
the market, better encourage the development of Brazilian informatic companies.
I. BRAZILIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Formative Years
The industrial development of Brazil occurred in an uneven manner. 2 Follow-
ing independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil maintained a traditional agrarian
economy. It exported coffee, cotton, and cocoa, and imported manufactured
* Partner, Pinheiro Neto-Advogados; J.D. 1972, University of Sio Paulo School of Law; Gradu-
ate 1974 Special Management School, University of Mackenzie. The author would like to express his
gratitude to J. Michael Register and those members of Pinheiro Neto who aided in the preparation of
this article.
1. Lei No. 7.232, 1984 Coleqio das Leis [Coleq~o], Vol. (outubro)-Leg. (Brazil).
2. The information in this article concerning the history of Brazilian industrial policy is from a
symposium given by Olavo Setubal on informatics.
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products. 3 Although Brazil had liberal legislation regulating industry, commerce,
and foreign investments, the laws proved insufficient to stimulate industrial de-
velopment during this period.
The world depression of 1930 altered the post-independence path of Brazilian
economic development. It created an acute shortage of manufactured products.
However, the greatest private economic force in Brazil, the agrarian sector,
lacked the resources and know-how to initiate the industrialization of Brazil. In
response, the Brazilian Government abandoned its laissez-faire economic philos-
ophy and adopted a policy of state participation in the industrial sector. Participa-
tion increased during and immediately following World War II, when Brazil
again suffered a shortage of manufactured products .
4
After World War II, multinational and Brazilian corporations began investing
heavily in industrial projects, often in joint ventures. These two groups, together
with the Brazilian Government, have shaped the modern industrial development
of Brazil.
1. The Automobile Industry
After World War II, intensive efforts were made to develop the Brazilian
automobile industry. The Brazilian Government took the initiative in this venture
by creating the Executive Group of the Automobile Industry (GEIA)5 to regulate
and stimulate the development of the automobile industry in Brazil. GEIA pro-
vided foreign automobile manufacturers incentives to establish subsidiary auto
assembly plants in Brazil. 6 At the same time, GEIA encouraged the development
3. See E. BURNS, A HISTORY OF BRAZIL 133-41 (1970).
4. For example, soon after World War L the metalworks plant at Volta Redonda was established by
the Brazilian Government. This investment received the endorsement of the President of the United
States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who authorized the necessary financial backing for the plant. The
North American American steel industry openly opposed President Roosevelt's support.
5. Decreto No. 39.412, 1956 Cole2fio, Vol. IV (junho)-Exec. (establishing guidelines for the
creation of the Automobile Industry and instituting the Grupo Executivo da Industria Automobilistica
(Executive Group of the Automobile Industry) (GEIA)).
6. Decreto No. 39.412, supra note 5. Under this decree, GEIA reduced or eliminated the duty on
parts imported for vehicle manufacture. This incentive was only granted for a limited period, id. at
art. 5, since GEIA's objective was to create an independent industry that could supply all automotive
parts. GEIA could also permit the immigration of technicians and specialized workers. Id. at art. 13.
The first plans approved by GEIA concerned trucks. See Decreto No. 39.568, 1956 Coleqio, Vol.
VI (julho)-Exec. In 1957, plans for passenger cars were also approved. GEIA intended that Bra-
zilian manufactured cars would contain 95 percent locally made parts by 1960. Decreto No. 41.018,
art. 4, 1957 Colegfo, Vol. 11 (fevereiro)-Exec. The GEIA required that proposals submitted to it
indicate the manner in which this percentage was to be attained. Id. at art. 6. By 1959, the engine had
to be locally manufactured and contain at least 60 percent Brazilian parts by weight. Id. at art. 7, § 2.
Similar plans concerning vehicles with four-wheel drive ("jipes") (Decreto No. 39.569, 1956 Col-
eqdo, Vol. VI (julho)-Exec.), light trucks (Decreto No. 39.676-A, 1956 Colegdo, Vol. VI (julho)-
Exec.), and farm tractors (Decreto No. 47.473, 1959 Colego, Vol. III (dezembro)-Exec.) were
also adopted. In addition, a law exempting plant equipment required for the local manufacture of
automotive parts and engines from import duties and consumer taxes was passed. Lei No. 2.993,
1956 Colegdo, Vol. VII (dezembro)-Leg. The federal government also allowed companies with
approved plans to import disassembled vehicles that could be completed with locally obtained parts.
Decreto No. 42.820, art. 91, 1957 Coleqfo, Vol. VIII (dezembro)-Exec. Import duties were
FIELD OF INFORMATICS 305
of national corporations to supply auto parts. The foreign automobile manufactur-
ers that participated in this program enjoyed substantial profits during this period,
primarily because these companies were able to import finished cars and compo-
nents not yet manufactured by national industries. Thus, in practice, the ex-
clusive market benefited the MNCs that were located in Brazil.
2. The Petroleum Industry
The experience of the petroleum industry in Brazil differed from the auto-
mobile industry. The MNCs were interested in distributing petroleum in Brazil,
but not in exploring or refining petroleum there. This situation sparked a strong
nationalist movement to expel the MNCs. During World War II when an oil
shortage threatened the country's survival, Brazil formed a state enterprise to
explore, transport, and refine petroleum reserves.
The Brazilian Government proposed a law in 1953, which created Petroleo
Brasileiro S.A. (PETROBRAS), a state-owned company.7 Given the combina-
tion of scarce domestic deposits and low oil prices in the international market,
PETROBRAS concentrated on refining and commercialization. In the early
1970s the threat of a diminishing supply of high priced crude oil forced the
country to modify its model of development. Brazil entered into service contracts
with MNCs that involved these corporations in prospecting and exploring for
oil. 8
Shortly thereafter, Brazil began to develop its industrial petrochemical sector. 9
It adopted a tripartite model based on joint ventures between state companies,
MNCs, and private Brazilian companies. It also created an exclusive market and
provided various incentives for attracting these companies. '0
reduced in proportion to the percentage of parts obtained locally. Id. at art. 91, para. 3. The
government also granted companies access to government financing at a lower than normal interest
rate. Decreto No. 39.412, supra note 5, at art. 1I. See also Pinheiro Neto & Dias da Silva, Incentives
for Investment in Brazil, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 123, 124 (1981).
7. Lei No. 2.004, 1953 Colegfo, Vol. VII (outubro)-Leg., established the National Petroleum
Policy, defined the responsibilities of the National Petroleum Council, and authorized the formation of
Petrrleo Brasileiro S.A. (PETROBRAS). Article I of this law exclusively authorized PETROBRAS
to: (1) search for and drill wells for oil and other liquid hydrocarbons and rare gases, existing within
national boundaries; (2) refine national or foreign oil; and (3) engage in the transport of Brazilian
crude oil or petroleum derivatives. Article 2 of the law stipulated that the PETROBRAS monopoly
was to be exercised through the National Petroleum Council, as the directing and financial organ of
PETROBRAS and its subsidiaries.
8. Numerous sectors of Brazilian society, suspecting that PETROBRAS lacked technological
capability, applauded the involvement of the MNCs in oil exploration. Despite contracts with more
than fifty MNCs and one Sho Paulo corporation, and investment of US $1.5 billion, no oil was
discovered.
9. Decreto No. 56.571, 1965 Coleqto, Vol. VI (julho)-Exec., expanded the petrochemical
industry and the branch of the chemical industry that had its origin in exploiting natural gas, and the
products and by-products of petroleum and shale. The Decreto did not include the production of
combustibles and lubricating oil from petroleum and asphalt.
10. Decreto-Lei No. 61.981, 1967 Coleqo, Vol. VIII (dezembro)-Exec., as regulated by Resolu-
tion No. 7 of August 20, 1968 of the National Petroleum Council.
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3. Recent Models
Currently, Brazil is working to develop the aerospace, communications,
atomic energy, and informatics industries. The Brazilian Government has created
a different model for each of these sectors.
In the case of the aerospace industry, the government adopted a model similar
to that utilized in the petroleum industry. It created a state owned company,
Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER),"1 which envisioned the
integration and support of the best engineering schools in the country.
The communications industry presented a different challenge. Following the
model of most European countries, the Brazilian Government nationalized the
private communications companies,"2 and stimulated joint ventures between pri-
vate Brazilian communications equipment suppliers and MNCs. As the only
buyer of communications equipment, the government retains control over tech-
nological development and can specify and standardize the technology that it
judges most convenient for the country. In the atomic industry Brazil adopted a
State monopoly model over all uranium processing. ' 3 This industry is being
developed through an accord signed by the Brazilian and West German
Governments.
II. THE FIELD OF INFORMATICS
In the early seventies the Brazilian Government recognized the vital role of
informatics in the development of the industrial, military, financial, and agri-
cultural sectors of its economy. Informatics policy has thus become a strategic
instrument in the economic development of Brazil. Through it, the Brazilian
Government hopes to develop technological capacity that will benefit all sectors
of the economy.
It. Decreto-Lei No. 770, 1969 Coleqdo, Vol. V (ag6sto)-Leg., authorized the formation of
Empresa Brasileira de Aerondutica S.A. (EMBRAER), to promote the development of the aero-
nautical industry and related activities, including the construction of seaplanes and related equipment,
and promotion of new or existing technical activities linked to the production and maintenance of
aeronautical material in accordance with programs and projects approved by the Chief Executive.
12. Lei No. 5.792, 1972 Coleqo Vol. V (julho)-Leg. (authorizing government involvement in
telecommunications services and authorizing the Chief Executive to form the firm TelecomunicaC6es
Brasileiras S.A. (TELEBRAS)). By the terms of Article 1 of this law, telecommunication services are
controlled by the Union, either directly or by its authorization. The Union also guarantees the
functioning of such services.
13. Lei No. 4.118, 1962 Coleqo, Vol. V (ag6sto)-Leg. This law established the National Policy
of Nuclear Energy and created the Comissdo Nacional de Energia Nuclear (National Nuclear Energy
Commission) (CNEN), granting the Union the exclusive right to: (1) explore the creation of uranium
mines in Brazil; (2) market nuclear elements and their composites, fission and enriched materials,
artificial radioisotopes and radioactive substances, nuclear byproducts; and (3) produce nuclear
materials. Lei No. 5.740, 1971 Colecgo, Vol. VII (dezembro)-Leg., authorized CNEN to form the
Companhia Brasileira de Tecnologia Nuclear (Brazilian Company of Nuclear Technology) (CBTN),
whose name was later changed to Empresas Nucleares Brasileiras Sociedade Andnima (Brazilian
Nuclear Companies S.A.) (NUCLEBRAS), by Lei. No. 6.189, 1974 Coleqfo, Vol. VII (de-
zembro)-Leg. Article I of this law states that the federal monopoly that Article I of Lei No. 4.118,
supra, established will be exercised through CNEN, as the primary body of planning, supervision,
fiscalization, and scientific research, and by NUCLEBRAS and its subsidiaries.
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A. Informatics Legislation and Policy
The Brazilian Government first began to outline an informatics policy in
1972.1 4 In 1972 the government created a commission to promote informatics, the
Comissao de Coordinacao das Actividados de Processamento Eletronico (Com-
mission for the Coordination of Electronic Processing Activities) (CAPRE). 5
CAPRE concentrated informatics services and equipment in government com-
panies and adopted measures to channel government investments into informatics
in order to increase utilization and installation of data processing equipment. 16 In
1979 CAPRE was replaced by the Secretaria Especial de Informatica (Special
Secretary for Informatics) (SEI). ' 7 Endowed with greater powers than its prede-
cessor, SEI created and implemented a national informatics policy. 18
The most recent formulation of the principles, purposes and guidelines govern-
ing the informatics industry was set forth in a 1984 law. 19 This law created the
National Informatics and Automation Council (CONIN) which reports to the
President of the Republic. CONIN does not replace the SEI. Under the Colegdo
das Leis the SEI reports to CONIN. The SEI must issue, disclose, and comply
with the resolutions of CONIN. CONIN assists the President in the formulation
of Brazilian informatics policy by establishing rules that control the cross-border
flow of data and by granting channels and means for data transmission to data
banks. Under the Coleqdo das Leis the SEI reports networks abroad to CONIN.
CONIN hears appeals from decisions of the SEI and gives its opinion on acts or
contracts involving activities related to informatics.20
The SEI must now issue, disclose, and comply with the resolutions of CONIN.
In addition, the SEI controls the domestic development and production of infor-
matics goods and gives its opinion on the importation of informatic goods and
services. SEI will continue to regulate the importation, manufacture and market-
ing of hardware and software, as well as technical services related to informatics
14. See J. PINHEIRo NETO, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL § 22.101 (1979).
15. See Decreto No. 70.370, 1972 Coleog,, Vol. IV (abril)-Exec., amended by Decreto No.
77.118, 1976 Coleqo, Vol. II (fevereiro)-Exec.
16. In 1976 CAPRE was totally restructured, Decreto No. 77.118, supra note 15, and in 1977 it
began to regulate private firms in the area of informatics. CAPRE established guidelines to control
which private firms could import parts for the manufacture of computers and provided selected firms
with fiscal benefits. The following are the factors CAPRE considered in giving fiscal benefits and
authorizing imports: (1) the index of national content of the equipment; (2) export potential of the
firm; (3) the amount of technology open to the national firm in "joint ventures"; (4) the degree of
participation of other firms in the market; and (5) the degree of control of the firm's capital by
Brazilian residents. J. PINHEIRO NEro, supra note 14, at § 22.101 (discussing CAPRE Resolution No.
01 of June I, 1977, art. 2). After promulgating these guidelines, CAPRE received 16 proposals for
manufacturing personal computers in Brazil. It selected only three projects and rejected the rest-
among them IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Olivetti, Burroughs, TRW-because their Brazilian subsidi-
aries did not have any Brazilian capital. Id. at n.7.
17. See Decreto No. 84.067, 1979 Coleqo, Vol. VIII (outubro)-Exec. See also Decreto No.
84.266, 1979 Colegio, Vol. VIII (dezembro)-Exec.
18. See III Piano Bdsico de Desenvolvimento Cientffico e Tecnol6gico (I1 Basic Plan for Scientific
and Technological Development) (PBDCT), approved by Decreto No. 85.118, 1980 Colegdo, Vol. IV
(setembro)-Exec., published in Difirio Oficial of September 4, 1980.
19. Lei No. 7.232, supra note 1.
20. See id.
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in Brazil. 2 Although some regulations may have to be revised to' comply with the
new law, informatics policy continues to favor Brazilian owned companies by
severely restricting access to the Brazilian market.
SEI restricts access to the Brazilian informatics market by requiring domestic
importers to obtain its approval before receiving a license to bring electronic data
processing equipment into the country. 22 SEI will not approve a license to import
equipment if a viable source exists in the domestic market. 2 3 Thus, the licensing
requirement effectively eliminates foreign imports of informatics equipment into
Brazil when domestic producers have the ability to manufacture the same or
similar products.
SEI has also limited access to the Brazilian informatics market for multina-
tional corporations with plants in Brazil. SEI has promulgated normative acts that
reserve the Brazilian market for certain types of small hardware, such as elec-
tronic mini- and micro-computers and video terminals, to Brazilian companies in
which the power for decision-making and management of the company's busi-
ness and capital are permanently and exclusively in the hands of individuals
residing and domiciled in Brazil.2 4 Hence an MNC that is not a "national com-
21. See id.
22. J. PINHEIRO NEro, supra note 14, at § 22.103 (discussing Resolution No. 121 of December 17,
1979, of the National Council on Foreign rade).
23. Id. (discussing SEI Normative Acts No. 001 of March 27, 1980).
24. Id. at § 22.106, n.2. Applications for the production plans for the manufacture of hardware are
regulated by SEI Normative Acts No. 016 of June 10, 1981; No. 017 of June 10, 1981; No. 018 of
August 6, 1981; and a number of SEI Communiqu&s. These regulations prohibit SEI from approving
plans from Brazilian companies controlled by foreign capital (Brazilian subsidiaries of foreign MNCs
or companies controlled by foreign MNCs), for the manufacture of the following equipment: (i)
electronic mini- and micro-computers and their accessories, as well as all hook-up equipment; (2)
electronic cash registers; (3) electronic word processing machinery, except electronic typewriters
having a memory capacity of up to 256 characters of text and without editing facility; (4) electronic
machinery for accounting use; (5) financial terminals and their control units; (6) electronic ticket
authenticating and issuing equipment; (7) modulator/demodulator (MODEM) and units of analog and
digital derivation; (8) video terminals and their control units; (9) terminals for remote access to data
bases; (10) equipment for data input; (11) electronic communication processors; (12) multiple digital
signal units for data communication; (13) digital signal concentrator units for data communication;
(14) teleprinters having a transmission and reception speed in excess of 75 Bauds; (15) equipment for
remote reproduction of documents; (16) process control instrumentation, programmable control units,
remote supervision and control stations, registers of events and similar equipment for use in process
control; (17) numerical command equipment; (18) secrecy equipment, or equipment which uses
codes; (19) "daisy wheel" technology text processors; (20) "super-mini" personal computers and
their accessories; (21) equipment for processing information in connection with measuring and testing
equipment. Id.
Pinheiro Neto notes: "Furthermore, to obtain SEI approval, interested Brazilian companies must
prove that their capital is compatible with the undertaking and that they will use technology developed
in Brazil, to the extent possible." Id. at § 22.106. The SEI may waive this requirement, however, if a
certain technology is not available in Brazil and if the products that are to be manufactured in Brazil
are of national interest. Id. at § 22.106, n.4 (discussing SEI Normative Act No. 16 of June 10, 1981,
art. l(c)).
When analyzing the production plans submitted by Brazilian companies, SEI will take several
factors into account, including: (1) the potential of exporting the product, with a view to expanding
the scale of the undertaking; (2) the technological profile and industrial experience of the proposing
company; (3) the software already developed in Brazil; (4) the suitability of the technical and
operational characteristics of the product to the needs of the domestic market; (5) the development of
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pany" with operations in Brazil is precluded from participating in the smaller
hardware market in Brazil, regardless of the price or quality of its products.
The concept of a national company, as used by the SET, has been refined in the
1984 law. National companies are now defined as legal entities with a head office
in Brazil, controlled by individuals residing and domiciled in Brazil, or by
domestic public entities. The term "control" includes: (1) decision-making con-
trol-the legal or de facto exercise of the power to elect the officers of the
company and to direct the functioning of the company's bodies; (2) technological
control-the legal or de facto exercise of the power to develop, generate, acquire,
transfer, or change the product's technology and production process; and (3)
capital control-direct or indirect holding of all capital with actual or potential
voting rights, and at least 70 percent of the company's capital stock. 
25
The production of other kinds of hardware, such as large computers, is not
restricted solely to Brazilian companies. These goods may be produced by com-
panies controlled by foreign capital if SEI approves the project. However, SEI
may deny approval if it determines that the project can be implemented by
Brazilian technology and capital.
26
local suppliers; and (6) the plans for absorbing and generating technology. Id. at § 22.106 (discussing
SEI Normative Act No. 16 of June 10, 1981, art. 2).
In the case of "super-mini" personal computers, which may only be produced by companies
controlled by Brazilian capital, SEI permits the production plan to be submitted in the name of a
single company or of a consortium or group of companies or of any kind of association permitted by
law, provided that they are held by Brazilians. Id. at § 22.107 (discussing SEI Communiqud No. 007
of December 23, 1982).
25. Lei No. 7.232, supra note 1.
26. J. PINHEIRO NETO, supra note 14, at § 22.108, n. 1 and accompanying text (discussing SEI
Normative Act No. 017 of July 10, 1981). Upon analyzing and evaluating plans for the production of
equipment that may be manufactured by companies controlled by foreign capital, SEI will consider
the following: (1) the compatibility of the formation and structure of the share capital with the size of
the project; (2) evidence that the product does not interfere with the market segment reserved for
Brazilian companies; (3) guidance available to stimulate the execution of the project, where the
decision-making power is permanently located in Brazil; (4) capacity for the generation and absorp-
tion of design technology for hardware and software; (5) the technological profile and industrial
experience of the company which will head the project; (6) the software developed in Brazil; (7) the
growing index of nationalization of the production equipment and the goods produced; (8) the
development of local suppliers; (9) the degree of utilization of components produced in Brazil; (10)
the evaluation of the participation of various companies in the market; (11) the potential for exporting
the product; (12) examination of the plan for providing service to the product users; (13) when the
project involves foreign technology, the availability of the technology to Brazilian manufacturers; (14)
in enterprises that are associated with foreign capital, besides the conditions calling for open tech-
nology for the products indicated in the plan, similar access in the field of basic components and
consumption materials. Id. at § 22.108 (discussing SEI Normative Act No. 017 of July 10, 1981, art.
1.).
The issuance of import licenses by CACEX for electronic computers, their peripheral equipment,
components, or accessories for electronic data processing systems is also subject to express authoriza-
tion by SEI. When deciding whether to authorize an importation, SEI examines the following factors:
(1) the utilization of a domestic alternative, including the use of distributed computation; (2) the stock
of software already developed in Brazil, by the requesting entity, which, because of the terms it uses,
makes the use of incompatible domestic equipment inviable; and (3) the utilization of software that is
specific and indispensable to the activities of the user, which software is not appropriate to develop
within Brazil, and which is added to the equipment to be imported. Id. at § 22.103.
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SEI is moving in the same direction in the area of software and technical
services. With regard to foreign companies, SEI will only approve government
contracts for technical services if a viable domestic alternative does not exist. 27
Furthermore, SEI now requires the separation of transactions relating to infor-
matics hardware, equipment, and devices from transactions relating to software
and technical informatics services . 2 This requirement is viewed as a prelude to
further restrictions in favor of Brazilian national companies. SEI will, however,
permit the purchase of foreign technology used in the manufacture of informatics
equipment, provided that a contract assures the Brazilian company autonomous
use of the technology upon the contract's termination. These technology transfer
agreements also require prior approval of the National Institute of Industrial
Property (INPI).
29
The avowed purpose behind SEI's policy is to limit Brazil's dependence on
foreign informatics companies by developing a Brazilian domestic industry com-
posed of national companies. 30 SEI authorities believe that, given sufficient
breathing room, the Brazilian informatics industry can quickly acquire the tech-
nological know-how and the manufacturing capability to adequately supply the
Brazilian market. Perhaps SEI authorities envision that after that point the Bra-
zilian informatics industry will become a major competitor in the world market.
B. Specific Fiscal Incentives to National Companies
The 1984 law on informatics contemplates a variety of fiscal incentives for
national companies in the informatics industry. "' National companies undertak-
27. Pursuant to SEI Normative Act No. 23 of January 17, 1983, art. 1, para. 1, I., technical
informatics services are defined as follows: (1) data processing, including data gathering and prepara-
tion, processing of information on automatic data processing equipment, storage and retrieval of
information, and the issuance of results and reports; (2) the conceptualization, development, setting-
up, marketing, operation, and maintenance of software; (3) consulting services in informatics, includ-
ing auditing and management activities for informatics; and (4) personnel training in informatics
techniques. Id. at § 22.111.
For this purpose, SEI has defined a Brazilian company as a legal entity duly organized in Brazil,
with its head office in Brazil, under the permanent, unconditional decision-making, technological,
and capital control of individuals residing and domiciled in Brazilian territory. SEI also requires that
at least two thirds of the technical staff be made up of Brazilians. Id. (discussing SEI Normative Act
No. 23 of Jan. 17, 1983, art. 1, para. 1, II.).
28. Id. at § 22.104 (discussing SEI Normative Act No. 25 of September 13, 1983).
29. See J. PINHEIRO NETo, supra note 14, at § 22.110, n.3. A Normative Act issued jointly by SEI
and INPI under Nos. 13 and 53 of February 18, 1982 deals with the procedures for the examination of
agreements for the transfer of technology in the field of informatics. Although licensing and transfer
of technology in Brazil is under the authority of INPI, when the subject matter of those agreements is
software or hardware, SEI becomes involved in the approval of the respective agreements. The Act
orders a joint committee made up of personnel from SEI and INPI to meet periodically to examine
and recommend the approval of transfer of technology agreements. In order to obtain approval, the
interested party must submit the draft agreement to INPI for prior consultation. INPI, in turn, will
forward it to SE! for later examination by the joint committee. The agreement must then be resubmit-
ted to INPI for final approval. Once the agreement has been approved by INPI, and if it involves
remittances abroad, the agreement must also be submitted for registration at the Central Bank of
Brazil so that the licensee or recipient may make remittances abroad to the supplier or licensor.
Approval of the agreement by INPI is also required in order for the licensee or the recipient to deduct
the fees paid the licensor or supplier as business expenses for income tax purposes.
30. Decreto 84.067, supra note 17.
31. Lei No. 7.232, supra note I. Any company either directly or indirectly controlled by the
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ing research projects and the production of informatics goods and services may
be granted:
(1) exemption or reduction to zero of import duties in cases of importation with
no domestic equivalent for (a) equipment, machinery, devices and instruments,
and respective accessories, parts, and tools; and (b) components, intermediary
products, raw materials, parts and pieces, and other inputs;
(2) exemption from export tax, in cases of exportation of goods that have been
ratified by CONIN;
(3) exemption or reduction to zero of the tax on manufactured products for (a)
the goods referred to in item (1) above, whether imported or produced in Brazil,
with the suppliers being assured of maintenance of the tax credit in connection
with raw materials, intermediary products, parts, pieces and other inputs used in
the manufacturing process; and (b) for final products that have been ratified by
CONIN;
(4) exemption or reduction to zero of the tax on credit, exchange, and insur-
ance transactions and on transactions with regard to securities, to be levied on
exchange transactions linked to payment of the price of the goods and of agree-
ments for transfer of technology;
(5) up to a double deduction from taxable corporate income for expenditures
made in their own or third party programs previously approved by CONIN, that
are intended for research and development of goods and services or for the
formation, training, and improvement of human resources in the informatics
sector;
(6) accelerated depreciation of goods intended for the fixed assets;
(7) priority in direct financing granted by federal financial institutions or in
direct financing through on-lending of administrative funds by such institutions,
for defrayal of investments in fixed assets, including goods of foreign origin that
have no domestic equivalent.32
National companies carrying out physical -chemical processing for the man-
ufacture of semi-conductor electronic components and optical electronics may
also be granted a reduction of taxable profit. The reduction, authorized by a
decision of the President of the Republic, is a percentage equal to the proportion
between the gross income from such goods and the total income of the company.
In addition, companies using such inputs may, as an incentive, be granted the
right to deduct twice the purchase price from the taxable profit. 3"
Furthermore, where a software development project is of interest to Brazil's
Government, the project may be granted a reduction in taxable profit in a percent-
age equal to the proportion between the gross income from sales of such software
and the company's total income. 
3 4
For fiscal years 1986 through 1995, Brazilian companies may deduct one
percent of their corporate income tax provided they invest a like sum in new
shares of national private companies that have as their sole or principal activity
Brazilian Government or one of its states cannot avail itself of benefits other than those described in
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the production of goods and services for the informatics sector. However, Bra-
zilian companies are prohibited from investing in companies of the same multina-
tional conglomerate or in companies not approved by CONIN.
In the case of informatics goods and services judged useful for domestic,
scientific, and productive activities, but for which there are no national com-
panies qualified to meet domestic market needs, production may be by non-
national companies. These companies must: (1) receive CONIN approval for the
training of technical staff in product and production process technologies; (2)
invest a sum fixed by CONIN in the National Informatics and Automation Plan in
research and development activities, either directly or through an agreement with
a technological research and development center or a Brazilian university; (3)
submit an export plan; and (4) establish development programs for local sup-
pliers. This provision does not apply to the products and services of companies
that already produce and market in Brazil in accordance with projects approved
by the SEI. CONIN will only authorize acquisition of technology abroad when
there is a recognized market interest, and there is no Brazilian company tech-
nically qualified to meet the demand. 35
The use of foreign technology by non-national companies is conditioned upon
production exclusively for the foreign market and production units located in an
informatics export district. Informatics export districts include municipalities
located in the areas of the Development Authority for Amazonia (SUDAM) and
Development Authority for the Northeast (SUDENE) that have been indicated by
the Executive Branch and named by the National Congress. 36
C. Other Incentives and Environmental Concerns
Several other types of fiscal incentives are available in Brazil to foster eco-
nomic growth. These incentives were implemented for a variety of reasons
ranging from the desire to protect the environment to the need to develop certain
regions of the country. 7
1. Regional and Sectoral Incentives
The most important regional agencies, the Development Authority for Ama-
zonia (SUDAM) and the Development Authority for the Northeast (SUDENE),
grant incentives for agricultural, livestock, industrial, and basic services pro-
jects. The SUDAM area is formed by the states of Acre, Amazonas, and Para; the
federal territories of Amapa and Roraima; the state of Mato Grosso do Norte; and
parts of the states of Goias and Maranhao. The SUDENE area is formed by the
states of Piaui, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernanbuco, Alagoas,





37. See generally Pinheiro Neto & Dias da Silva, supra note 6; Mendes, Brazilian Legislation on
Industrial Development (pts. I & 2), 33 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 198, 266 (1979).
38. See Decreto-Lei No. 756, 1969 Coleqdo, Vol. V (ag6sto)-Leg. (SUDAM); and Lei No.
3.692, 1959 Coleqo, Vol. V111 (dezembro)-Leg. (SUDENE). SUDAM and SUDENE grant three
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Brazilian companies are allowed to deduct 25 percent of their corporate in-
come tax for approved projects in the SUDAM and SUDENE areas. Companies
with their own projects may invest their tax incentive allowance in these projects.
Another important regional agency is the Free Zone of Manaus39 Authority
(SUFRAMA). The manufacture and sale of domestic and foreign products in this
zone are exempt from the tax on manufactured products (IPI) 40 and the tax on the
distribution of goods (ICM). 41 Imported goods are exempt from import duty.
Furthermore, the sale of products manufactured in this area to places outside the
zone of Manaus is also exempt from ICM and IPI taxes.
The sectoral incentives consist of tax reduction or exemption, and the contri-
bution of funds as non-voting equity capital. These incentives will only be
granted to a company if its project has been duly approved by the appropriate
governmental authority. 42 If a project is carried out in more than one area, all the
tax incentives granted to the program are available to the project.
2. Additional Tax Incentives
Tax incentives are also granted by the Industrial Development Council (CDI)
in favor of industrial development projects. CDI uses several different methods to
encourage development: (1) import duties and IPI tax reductions or exemptions
for equipment, machinery, instruments, accessories, and tools not produced in
types of incentives. First, they may grant equity investment in the Investment Fund for Amaz6nia
(FINAM), the Private Investment Fund in the Development of Amazonia (FIDAM), the Northeast
Investment Fund (FINOR), and the Northeast Research and Natural Resources Fund (FURENE). This
equity investment is made with funds deducted from corporate income tax. Second, they may grant
exemption from income tax and non-refundable additional charges for a period of ten years to
industrial and agricultural undertakings in the SUDAM and SUDENE areas. The undertakings must
be set up, modernized, expanded, or diversified. Third, they may grant exemption or reduction from
import duty, from the tax on industrialized products (IPI), and from other federal duties for the
importation of machinery and equipment not produced in Brazil, if the undertaking intends to
implement projects approved by these agencies. See infra note 40.
39. Manaus is the capital of the State of Amazonas.
40. See Lei No. 4.502, 1964 Coleqdo, Vol. VII (novembro)-Leg.; Decreto No. 83.263, 1979
Coleqdo, Vol. II (marzo)-Exec. amended by Decreto No. 84.113 Coleqo, Vol. VIII (outubro)-
Exec. The tax on manufactured products (IPI) is assessed on a value-added basis. Generally the IPI
tax becomes due when the product leaves the plant where it was subject to some stage of industrializa-
tion or a separate establishment maintained by the industry which manufactured the same, and, in
some cases, when the product leaves a wholesale warehouse. The IPI tax on imported products is due
at the time of the clearance.
41. See Decreto-Lei No. 406, 1968 Coleqdo, Vol. VII (dezembro)-Leg., amended by Decreto-
Lei No. 834, 1968 Coleqfo, Vol. V (setembro)-Leg. The tax on the circulation of goods (ICM)
accounts for a substantial part of the revenue of the various states. Similar to the IPI tax, the ICM tax
is also assessed on a value-added basis. The ICM tax, however, is due on all stages of the commer-
cialization process and is assessed on the price of the product.
42. For example, the Fishing Development Authority (SUDEPE) is responsible for directing and
implementing the fishing development policy; the Brazilian Institute of Forest Development (IBDF) is
in charge of the forestation and reforestation policy; the Brazilian Tourism Company (EMBRATUR)
is responsible for formulating, coordinating and directing the Brazilian tourism policy; the Brazilian
Aviation Company (EMBRAER) is responsible for furthering the development of the aviation indus-
try by investing the funds at its disposal for designing and building its own aircraft; and the Executive
Group of the Mining Industry (GEIMI) furthers the exploitation of the country's mineral resources,
provides for the substitution of mineral imports, and encourages the exportation of mineral products.
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the country, and for parts which supplement national production; (2) credit to the
IPI tax amount for the purchase of domestically manufactured equipment; (3)
accelerated depreciation on nationally produced goods, for tax purposes; and (4)
preferred financial support from official credit entities.
43
The import duty and IPI tax exemptions are reserved for projects approved by
the President which are relevant to the national interest. For other projects CDI is
only authorized to grant reduction of import duties and the IPI tax. Rates of
seduction may vary from 50 to 80 percent. 44
An additional incentive, the ICM tax exemption, may exempt imports from
duties. In the event of mere reduction of import duties, however, the ICM tax will
be fully assessed. 45 Benefits may also be granted to imported supplementary
parts which comply with pre-established nationalization indices.
3. Export Incentives
While regional and sectoral incentives remain available, the emphasis of the
Brazilian Government has been on fostering export programs. The agencies
responsible for granting incentives for export of manufactured products are the
Commission for the Concession of Tax Benefits to Special Export Programs
(BEFIEX) 46 and the Commission of Export Incentives (CIEX). 47 The benefits
granted by BEFIEX may not be enjoyed cumulatively with other tax incentives
provided for in current law.48 Full import duty and IPI tax exemption may be
granted for export programs deemed to be of relevant economic interest to the
country and approved by the President of the Republic.
In order to obtain tax incentives from BEFIEX, a Brazilian company must
maintain a positive balance in its foreign currency transactions. In other words,
the total amount of all inflows of foreign currency, including investments, loans,
and payments for exports, must exceed the total amount of outflows of foreign
currency, including payment of interest, dividends, royalties, and price of im-
ports, by an amount agreed to by BEFIEX. In order to obtain these tax incentives
from BEFIEX, the company must agree to an export program expressly estab-
lishing the commitments to be assumed by the company regarding minimum
43. Decreto-Lei No. 1.137, 1970 Coleqdo, Vol. VII (dezembro)-Leg.
44. Decreto No. 77.065, 1976 Coleqdo, Vol, 11 (janeiro)-Exec.
45. Decreto-Lei No. 406, art. I, § 4, para. VI 1968 Coleqfo, Vol. VII (dezembro)-Leg.
46. See Decreto-Lei No. 1.219, 1972 Coleqfo, Vol. III (maio)-Leg. The incentives granted by
BEFIEX include: (1) a 70 to 90 percent reduction of import duties and IPI tax on the importation of
machinery, equipment, devices, instruments, accessories, and tools required to implement the export
program; (2) a 50 percent reduction of import duties and IPI tax on the importation of raw materials,
components, and intermediary products relating to the export program; and (3) the deduction from
taxable profits of the portion of profit represented by exports of manufactured products.
47. See Decreto-Lei No. 491, art. 13, 1969 Coleqdo, Vol. 1 (marzo)-Leg.; amended by Decreto-
Lei No. 1.428, art. 9, 1975 Coleqdo, Vol. VII (dezembro)-Leg. The benefits granted to medium-
sized companies with export programs approved by CIEX include: (1) reduction of up to 90 percent of
the IPI tax and import duties on machinery and equipment destined for installation, expansion, or
modernization; and (2) reduction or exemption from income tax due on operations. Since March 31,
1980, CIEX's duties have been performed by BEFIEX.
48. Decreto-Lei No. 1.219, art. 15, 1972 Coleq~o, Vol. III (maio)-Leg.
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exports and a minimum positive balance in foreign currency transactions and the
benefits to be received in exchange. 49
Exports which are not part of government approved programs may also receive
tax benefits. Exported products are not subject to IPI and ICM taxes. In addition,
the manufacturer will receive a credit for IPI and ICM taxes paid for the purchase
of raw materials needed to manufacture exported products. Income derived from
exports is exempt from corporate income tax. Calculation of this benefit is
effected on a proportional basis with respect to total sales. A drawback system,
which consists of the exemption, refund, or suspension of import duties, IPI,
ICM, and other taxes assessed at the time of importation on items subsequently
industrialized and exported, also protects exports.
4. Financial Incentives: the FINEX Program
Financial incentives are also available for Brazilian exporters. The Export
Financing Fund (FINEX) was created to supply funds for Banco de Brasil S.A.,
through its Foreign Trade Department (CACEX), to finance the export and pro-
duction of industrial companies that want to begin or increase foreign sales of
their products.
Under current regulations, CACEX can use FINEX funds to (1) extend financ-
ing to Brazilian exporters; (2) extend financing in the amount of the payments
made by a Brazilian exporter to foreign importers (directly or indirectly through
foreign financing institutions); (3) extend financing for local expenses to com-
panies or institutions abroad that order jobs and services from Brazilian com-
panies; or (4) refinance financing extended by authorized banks.
50
The Central Bank of Brazil authorizes the use of FINEX funds to equalize the
rates of export financing extended by accredited Brazilian banks with their own
funds or with foreign lines of credit. The purpose of this equalization is to adjust
Brazilian rates to the rates for equivalent operations in the international market.
5. Environmental Factors
An important consideration for an informatics company contemplating the
establishment of a factory in Brazil is the geographical location. Brazil has
enacted legislation for industrial zoning to protect the environment from the
consequences of indiscriminate installation of industrial establishments.51 The
critical geographic areas in terms of pollution are the metropolitan areas of Sdo
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Salvador, Porto Alegre, Curitiba,
the areas around Cubatao and Volta Redonda, the middle and lower zones of the
49. Id. at art. 4. Export programs have been signed for ten year periods. The total value is normally
around US $400 million, although it may be as large as US $1.5 billion. There are also export
programs for small and medium industries which establish export commitments for substantially
smaller amounts. Experience has shown that only major companies, nearly always large international
companies, have assumed the risk involved in signing special export commitments with BEFIEX.
The ruling may be broadened to permit export commitments for only five years and thus allow smaller
national companies to have access to these incentives.
50. Lei No. 5.025, art. 60, 1966 Coleqo, Vol. III (junho)-Leg.
51. See Decreto No. 76. 389, art. 8, 1975 Coleqdo, Vol. VIII (outubro)-Exec.
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Tiete river basin, the Paraiba do Sul basin, the Jacui river, the Guaiba estuary, and
all the hydrographic basins in the state of Pernanbuco. 52
The government licensing of factories whose activities are considered to be
polluting, or even potentially polluting, is one step that has been taken to prevent
environmental deterioration. Legislation adopted in 198053 sets basic guidelines
for industrial zoning in the critical pollution areas, grants exclusive authority to
the state pollution control agencies to license the construction, operation and
expansion of industrial establishments in such areas. 1
4
D. Labor
Except for a few restrictions imposed on industrial sectors not relevant to the
informatics industry, there are no specific rules on labor, management, or trade
which adversely affect the local subsidiaries of MNCs engaged in the informatics
activities in Brazil. Like many other countries, Brazil has taken steps to preserve
the job opportunities of its nationals. In view of the shortage of technicians and
the competition from foreign labor, Brazil introduced the principle of propor-
tionality by which all industrial and commercial companies with more than three
employees are required to ensure that at least two-thirds of their personnel are
Brazilians. 5 This proportion may only be reduced by governmental decree. To
obtain a reduction, the shortage of Brazilian workers for the jobs in question
must be verified by the National Department of Labor and the Statistical Depart-
ment of the Social Security Service. The two-thirds ratio must also be observed
in the firm's payroll. For the purpose of the two-thirds rule, foreigners who have
been residents of Brazil for more than ten years and who have a Brazilian wife or
child are considered Brazilians.
III. CONCLUSION
The new informatics policy in Brazil may have serious adverse effects on other
sectors of the Brazilian economy. The policy precludes or severely limits invest-
ment of foreign capital in the informatics industry in Brazil. This investment,
were it allowed, could provide Brazil with an influx of foreign currency that
would help alleviate its current exchange crisis. Similarly, Brazil may lose the
foreign currency earnings that would result from the export of informatics equip-
ment abroad by MNCs. It appears unlikely that in the near future Brazilian
companies could mount a significant export program to compete with' MNCs
abroad. If they had this capability, then obviously there would be no need to
restrict the home market.
52. Id.
53. Lei No. 6.803, art. 9, 1980 Coleq5o, Vol. V (julho)-Leg.
54. If, for instance, a company plans to set up a factory in greater S~o Paulo it must be authorized
by the appropriate state agency which, in this case, would be the State Basic Sanitation Company
(CETESB). See, e.g., Decreto-Lei No. 1.431, art. 4, 1975 Cole 5o, Vol. VII (agbsto)-Leg.;
Decreto No. 76.389, supra note 51.
55. See Consolidated Labor Laws (CLT), art. 354, approved by Decreto-Lei No. 5.452, 1943
Coleqdo, Vol. VIII (maio)-Exec.
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Aside from the economics of attracting foreign capital through foreign invest-
ment in the Brazilian informatics industry and through the subsequent potential
export earnings of these investments, the informatics policy may have a direct
effect on other Brazilian industries. Without competition from abroad, the do-
mestic informatics companies will be the sole suppliers of most of the Brazilian
informatics market. Since these informatics companies lack the experience of
some of the global leaders in informatics, their costs, and consequently their
prices for producing similar products, will inevitably run higher. Their lack of
experience in the field may also affect the quality of their products. Conse-
quently, Brazilian companies will most likely pay a higher cost for lower quality
equipment than if they had the option of purchasing from foreign competitors.
Because of the pervasive use of informatics in all industries today, these two
factors-higher cost and lower quality-will directly affect the price of other
Brazilian manufactured products. The higher cost of informatics technology must
necessarily be passed on to the purchaser in the form of a higher-priced product.
Furthermore, lower quality informatics technology will decrease efficiency in
production. With less efficiency, the cost of manufacturing a product rises,
likewise resulting in a higher-priced product. This reasoning applies whether the
informatics equipment and technology is used in production or for subsidiary
support, such as taking inventory or computing the payroll.
Higher-priced products result in higher prices for the consumer in Brazil, and
also higher prices for Brazilian exports. With higher-priced exports, Brazil's
competitiveness against other countries decreases. For example, if the Republic
of Korea (South Korea) produces steel using more advanced and inexpensive
technology from the United States and Japan, its competitive position in the
world steel market vis-a-vis Brazil will be enhanced.
The new informatics policy in Brazil may have political repercussions as well.
The present Brazilian Government's position on informatics may make it harder
for Brazil to bargain for export concessions from some of the high-tech countries
in areas in which it may have a true comparative advantage. The Brazilian
Government's erection of trade barriers in the informatics area will only fuel
protectionist arguments in these countries. Congressional representatives in the
United States may point to Brazil's informatics policy as a means to justify
protectionist legislation for constituents who compete directly with Brazilian
exporters. For instance, a congressman from California or Florida might use the
Brazilian informatics policy as leverage to obtain higher tariffs on citrus fruit.
These arguments strongly suggest that the Brazilian Government must begin to
reformulate its informatics policy to permit the participation of foreign com-
panies in the Brazilian market. The new informatics policy of the Brazilian
Government does not do this. Instead, it reserves the market for the next eight
years for the domestic informatics industry. This policy, even if minor changes
are adopted, cannot attract the participation of foreign companies in the field of
informatics in Brazil.
The Brazilian Government's objective in the informatics industry should be to
foster a policy that accommodates the interests of both domestic and foreign
producers. It should allow foreign participation in the market and encourage the
development of Brazilian national informatics companies.
318 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES
In exchange for allowing foreign companies to participate in the Brazilian
market the government should exact concessions. These could include requiring
companies to: make contributions to Brazilian research and development pro-
grams; make commitments for a minimum level of capital investment in Brazil
and a minimum level of exports from Brazil; agree to share technology with
Brazilian national companies; and develop training programs in informatics for
Brazilians. With such requirements imposed upon these companies, Brazilians
could learn informatics technology on a larger scale and in a shorter time than if
the foreign companies were excluded from competing in the Brazilian market. In
addition, this more advanced informatics technology would permit Brazilians to
improve existing national companies or to start new ventures. As demonstrated
by the experience of United States companies in the Silicon Valley, competitive
new ventures are feasible in the informatics industry, unlike in some more cap-
ital-intensive industries. At the same time, the Brazilian Government could assist
the development of the national informatics industry by sponsoring tax and fiscal
benefits for national companies.
Adopting this approach appears to be the best solution for resolving the con-
flict between creating a truly national informatics industry and damaging other
sectors of the economy. Although this policy does not give Brazilian companies
exclusive access to the Brazilian market, it in no way forecloses their participa-
tion. More importantly, the policy increases the availability of more advanced
informatics equipment and technology in the Brazilian market, which in turn
ensures greater Brazilian competitiveness in the world market.
